It is not a straightforward task to address the various manifestations of ‘inter-Slavic solidarity’ in the modern period, considering the numerous expressions of this spiritual, cultural and sometimes also political movement that have followed one another in different times and places, in some cases leaving a tangible memory, in others surviving in a condition of lasting latency. This long-lasting memory survived even during the Soviet period, molded in a new shape. It reappears, for example, in the conception of the eternal brotherhood between Russia and Ukraine which was fostered not only in the 19th, but also in the 20th century. However, in the Soviet Union the original thought of the fathers of Pan-Slavism underwent new, communist interpretation. In short, Pan-Slavism is characterized by a polysemous essence; it was interpreted by its followers depending on political situation.

One of the most groundbreaking theories about such manifestations was worked out by Nikolaï (Mykola, according to Ukrainian diction and historiography) Ivanovich Kostomarov (1817-1885), a historian of Russia and Ukraine, born in the village Jurasovka/Jurasivka, in the Voronezh Guberniia. His theory about Slavdom, original and closely linked to the

---

* I wish to thank Tommaso Leoni, Karen Macfarlane, and Marina Pastore for their help with the English version of this paper.
tradition of Russian thinking,1 did not have any success, either during his lifetime—when it was censured by Nicholas I’s Realpolitik—or in the following years, since the model he created is even nowadays not well-known. I do believe, however, that his theory can offer a wealth of information of topical interest to the contemporary researcher, along with other ideas that today may look obsolete or inevitably connected to the time in which they were originally conceived. It is important to emphasize that the theoretical Pan-Slavic federation that Kostomarov envisaged could have become a real alternative political model: it did not materialize due to its congenital weaknesses and incongruities, and most especially because of the hostility it encountered on a political level.

I shall therefore propose a series of observations on the Slavophile and at the same time Ukrainophile ideas of young Kostomarov, conceived during the 1840s. He was forced to abjure these ideas after being convicted because of them by the Russian authorities. Then, at the beginning of the 1860s, Kostomarov decided to go back to those ideas, although in a more moderate version, at the time of his experience in St. Petersburg.

As it is well known to the Slavists, Kostomarov made the most important contribution to the foundation of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood (founded in Kiev in 1846),2 in-

---

1 Kostomarov’s theory is so deeply connected to Russian thinking that it could well be considered a ‘page of the Slavophilism’—if we would paraphrase Franco Ventura’s famous definition of Russian Populism (narodnichestvo).

2 In 1846 Kostomarov, after a bright but tormented student career (he was forbidden to prepare a dissertation about the Union of Brest between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches, as it was considered a ticklish topic both by political authorities and by ecclesiastical ones), he taught Russian history at the University of Kiev as Assistant Professor. His first course, according to the example of his previous academic masters—Mikhail Lunin and Petro Gulak-Artemovskii—focused on old Slaves’ mythology. It was especially around this university environment
spired by the tradition—at that time not yet forgotten—of the secret associations that had fomented the Decembrist uprising. By gathering together some prominent members of the still embryonic Ukrainophile intelligentsia—such as Taras Shevchenko, Panteleimon Kulish, Vasyl Bilozers’kyi, and Mykola Hulak—Kostomarov wanted to infuse dignity into the concept of a Ukrainian nation. At the time, the Ukrainian nation was considered an inseparable and indeed minor part of a ‘common-Russian nationality’ (obshcherusskii narod), organized by Minister Sergei Uvarov through his famous ‘Triad.’ The recognition of Ukraine’s national aspirations should have been combined, in Kostomarov’s opinion, with the Slavophile tendency. This tendency, which was to give greater authoritiveness to the model worked out by the Brothers (Bratchyky), already had a solid tradition in the cultural Slavic environment. In its modern form it was developed at the beginning of the 19th century by Slovak philologists Jan Kollár and Pavol Josef Šafárík. In particular, Kollár and Šafárík were the first to elaborate the enduring concept of ‘Slavic reciprocity’ (slavianskaia vzaimnost’); they did so within a context—that of the Habsburg Empire—where Slavic peoples that were subject to it were not considered ruling nationalities.³

In light of this, it seems clear that the concept of nationality (narodnost’) was interpreted in a somewhat different

³ I think that all the Slavic utopias—and so also the one devised by Kostomarov—were characterized by a peculiar detachment from the concrete political reality of their time, as Vittorio Strada underlined, in accordance with the Nikolaï Michailovskii’s thought. See V. Strada, Prefazione, in: A. Walicki, Una utopia conservatrice. Storia degli slavofili, Torino, 1973, pp. XVII-XVIII. In every case, the Slavophile philosophy (and all the branches it is divided in) had an absolute importance for the more general History of Russian Thought. The Slavophilism is a kind of privileged lens that allows to observe how some intellectuals interpreted the Russian (and also Slavic) past.
way by the members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood from that established by Uvarov. As a matter of fact, Uvarov thought that nationality should be connected inseparably with autocracy and orthodoxy, in addition to being viewed against a background that did not question the social inequalities typical of the Ancien Régime. According to Kostomarov (and also his followers, such as Mykhailo Drahomanov), the idea of the nation could not be separated from the socio-economic emancipation of the lower strata and the fundamental democratization of the social system.4

At the beginning of the 19th century, the studies conducted by the ethnographer Mykhailo Maksymovych and the philologist Izmail Sreznevskiy, as well as the enjoyable literary works by Ivan Kotliarevsky and the young Nikolaï Gogol and the travel accounts written by Great-Russian noblemen5 drew the attention of the tsarist intelligentsia to the autochthonous culture of Little-Russia (Mala-Rossiia, according to the official denomination of the time). Little-Russia was generally celebrated as a bucolic and passionate land that was part of a strongly idealized South, but without any potential nationalistic virulence. At the same time Aleksandr Gilferding, an intellectual close to Slavophile circles in Moscow, contributed to spreading the belief that the Little-Russians were the link between Eastern and Western Slavic peoples, due to their cultural and linguistic peculiarities.6

The Ukrainophilism of the Bratchyky, contained (and possibly curbed) within a federal superstructure, led Kostomarov to long for the birth of a Pan-Slavic Republic, distin-

guished by a pacifist, democratic and evangelical character. This federation, directly inspired by Pavel Pestel’s theories, had to be organized as a spiritual and political union; it had to be formed as a gathering of all Slavic components and, moreover, it should bring about the dismemberment of the enormous Russia into various territories. Kostomarov envisioned a Parliament (Sejm) at the center of this Republic, with a President at the top; all of its members would have been elected by male suffrage according to an individual’s moral and intellectual qualities rather than according to social rank or economic status. The form of government of each confederate Republic would have been organized according to the same structure. When compared to the cultural circles which had formed during the 1840s, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood showed its originality first of all through its desire to overcome the social and economic divisions typical of the Ancien Régime, aiming at a whole new social balance, and also through its attempt to interpret the desiderata of subordinate orders.9

It is therefore possible at this point to describe the fundamental elements at the basis of Kostomarov’s ideas as follows:

1) Reformism, foreshadowing the changes of the Alexander II’s time, despite the contemporary police regime imposed by the tsar;

---


8 Kostomarov listed these nationalities in two different ‘text-manifestos’ drawn up at the moment of the Brotherhood foundation: these lists put in evidence some oversights, which is strange and unexpected considered his high level as a scholar. Cf. T.M. Prymak, Mykola Kostomarov: a Biography, Toronto 1996, p. 42.

2) The crucial importance attributed to culture and education, which had to be guaranteed to everybody;

3) Democracy and ‘Enlightenment,’ following the precedent of the Decembrists, with the consequent elimination of autocracy and privileges of rank (one of Kostomarov’s mottoes was: ‘Freedom, equality and human brotherhood’);

4) a Messianic kind of Slavophilism, chiefly influenced by Polish thinkers Adam Mickiewicz and Michał Czajkowski;\(^\text{10}\)

5) a Mazzini-type Romanticism, emerging through the ‘rediscovery’ of the nation, a process favored by ethnographic studies, which at that time were very popular;

6) Christianity, which lay at the core of Kostomarov’s Pan-Slavism.

Kostomarov therefore took a good deal of inspiration from Polish Slavophilism. At the beginning of the 19th century this kind of Slavophilism, despite being torn between its natural tendency to stress Slavic solidarity and even greater desire to re-establish the independence of the Polish Commonwealth, had favored the birth of various secret groups. During the early 1820s, these groups were trying to gain the support of the constitutionalist circles that operated behind the scenes in tsarist society. In particular, Kostomarov borrowed from Mickiewicz’s Messianic theory the notion that Ukraine rather than Poland was the ‘Christ of Nations.’ Kostomarov wrote *Knyhy bytiia ukrains’ko ho narodu* (Books of the genesis of the Ukrainian people), a pamphlet written in the Ukrainian language echoing both the style of the gospels and that of the ancient chronicles of Rus’, and also that of Mickiewicz’s *Ksiegi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (Books of the Polish Nation and the Polish Pilgrimage, 1832). The

\(^{10}\) From Michał Czajkowski Kostomarov borrowed the idea that Kiev was the ‘arch-Slavic’ city, belonged in the same way to the all-Slavic heritage. Moreover, the city should have been the capital of the whole federation. Cf. *Les Livres de la Genèse*, p. 46.
Bratchyky wanted this text of Kostomarov to be the manifesto for their society. In this work Ukraine–forgetting about the wrongdoings of its ungrateful Slavic sisters (Poland and Russia)–should have kept on loving them and also awakening them through the typical Christian meekness, so as to create with them a divine-like Trinity, which was to be the prelude to the birth of the desired Pan-Slavic community (sobornost’). Here is what Kostomarov said about that: “Ukraine lies in the grave, but she is not dead. Because her voice, the voice calling Slavdom to freedom and brotherhood, has spread across the Slavic world.”

This Slavic sobornost’ should have re-established the simple and egalitarian society typical of the prehistory and of the nature of the Slavs, which according to Kostomarov had later been corrupted by the invasions of Germanic and Tatar peoples. The latter were also considered responsible

---

11 In the opinion of Luca Calvi, the Knyhy should have been “a sort of catechism for Slavic nations”. See I Libri della genesi del popolo ucraino, ed. L. Calvi, in: “Annali di Ca’ Foscari” vol. 32, 1993, no. 1-2, p. 109.
12 I Libri della genesi, verse 95, p. 139.
13 The lack of any relationship between the autocracy and the typical communitarian Slavic culture has been clearly explained in the Knyhy bytiia ukrains’koho narodu: “although was the tsar, this one was foreigner, and although were noblemen, these too were foreigner; although these degenerates were of Ukrainian blood, nevertheless they did not soil with their dishonourable lips the Ukrainian language and they did not describe themselves Ukrainians, whereas a real Ukrainian either of humble origin or noble origin does not now love neither the tsar nor the nobleman, and has to instead love and remember only God–Jesus Christ, Tsar of the sky and the earth”; [...] a Slave does not love neither the tsar nor the nobleman, instead love and remember only God–Jesus Christ, Tsar of the sky and the earth” (ibidem, verses 93-95). In the first of these verses emerge also some considerations, very negative, about the progressive Russification of native Ukrainian elite.
14 I Libri della genesi, verse 95, p. 139. It is no doubt disturbing to observe that, in an absolutely detached context as the one we are considering, the Nazis tried to justify their paternalistic research of anti-Soviet
for making the temper of Moscow’s inhabitants ‘Asiatic,’ and so really hard, different from the purely Slavic meekness of Ukrainians.

In Kostomarov’s opinion, the most genuine incarnation of this community, which was at the same time Slavic and Christian, was the Cossack State (*Hetman´shchyna*) – an expression of authentic solidarity. This was a real society of equals, where their chiefs – elected by the public assembly and liable to be voted out by the same institution – had to be the ‘servants of everyone,’ according to Christ’s law. In Kostomarov’s words, this model should have been applied to the whole Slavdom: “in Ukraine everybody would soon have become Cossack, all free and equal, except for the only God, and, looking at Ukraine, the same thing would have happened in Poland, and later in the other Slavic countries.”

Kostomarov and Shevchenko’s enthusiasm for Poland was not by any means something to take for granted. In the 17th century there had been a very strong rivalry between the nobles’ Polish Commonwealth and the Cossack State – although the latter was for a long time formally autonomous and yet controlled by the Polish Commonwealth. The mistrust towards Polish Catholicism was deeply rooted also in the Slavophile circles in Moscow that were at the height of their power precisely during the 1840s. About twenty years later, and anti-Russian support among the Ukrainians, by forcedly thinking that the Arians were descendants of Variags (the Scandinavian Normans), and that the Russians were an extraction ‘corrupted’ by the Tatar-Mongolian influence. Generally, and apart from the well-known forms of Ukrainian collaboration, these theories were soon left, and did not spare to the Ukrainians a treatment like *Untermenschen*, according to the original project of Hitler. Cf. R. Cecil, *Il mito della razza nella Germania nazista. Vita di Alfred Rosenberg*, Milano 1973.

15 *I Libri della genesi*, verse 76, p. 135.
16 Especially at their beginning, the Slavophile circles in Moscow seemed more interested in analyzing the historical and philosophical meaning
when Slavophilism had finally declined (not, however, without giving birth to numerous similar movements), the poet Fiodor Tiutchev defined Poland as the ‘Judas of Slavdom,’ especially because of her adherence to Roman Catholicism rather than to the Orthodox Church. According to the Slavophiles of Moscow, Orthodoxy was the most perfect form of Christianity and at the same time the most suitable to the Slavic spirit. In other words, the split between Eastern and Western Christianity, dividing Slavdom into two parts, was an insuperable problem for most Slavophile Utopians.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the modern social progressivism of the members of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood paradoxically went along with a kind of religious conservatism as far as any other lay or anticlerical philosophical conception was concerned.

According to the basic texts authored by the Bratchyky, the relationship with the Russian nation and the Pan-Russian Empire (Vserossiiskaia Imperiia) was also to be re-established—thanks to the benevolent example of ‘Martyr Ukraine’—through the elimination of autocracy and hereditary privileges.

of some concepts, such as, for example, of ‘Holy Russia’ or that one of obshchina, more than in other typical Pan-Slavic ideas. Cf. J. Isaevych, Pan-Slavism in Ukraine and Elsewhere: Past and Present, in: Ukraine’s Re-integration into Europe: a Historical, Historiographical and Politically Urgent Issue, ed. G. Brogi-Bercoff, G. Lami, Alessandria 2005, p. 27. The entire dislike of Slavophile circles towards Poland was expressed by Alekseï Khomiakov, who wanted to emphasize the Polish dependence to the European West, and also the gap between the common people ‘remained Slav’ and the Latinised nobility. Cf. A. Walicki, Una utopia conservatrice, p. 214.

17 A. Walicki, Una utopia conservatrice, pp. 213, 234 no. 145.
18 Ibidem, pp. 186-196.
19 This concept was expressed with particular clearness in the framework of historiosophy drawn in the Knyhy bytiia ukraїns’koho narodu, with regards to the laicism of the Philosophes, in the opinion of Kostomarov son of selfish reasons. Cf. I Libri della genesi, verses 49-53, p. 127.
After getting rid of this non-Slavic kind of yoke, the Russian and Ukrainian nations would finally overcome a twofold paradox resulting from a long-lasting historical process. According to this paradox, the Ukrainians, who were spontaneously anarchic, adopted socio-political institutions of a democratic and republican kind (though potentially libertarian). On the contrary, the Great-Russians, despite leaning towards populist collectivism, had entrusted the power to the monarchical institution, if only through the collective approval of *Zemskii Sobor*.20

If we consider the texts produced by the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood during its sole year of existence, it becomes clear that in Kostomarov’s thinking the concept of *slavian-skaia vzaimnost’* took on a particular moral meaning, since it was connected to individual freedom and to the freedom of nations, as well as to social promotion, to Christian meekness, and to the ideal of honesty.21 In addition, Kostomarov hoped for the liberation of every form of thinking from the imposition of censorship and also hoped to extend education to all social strata. More specifically, Kostomarov envisioned the teaching of the greatest number of Slavic languages, so as to end the anachronistic and anti-democratic division between

---

20 This concept, deeply discussed by Kostomarov, particularly in the pamphlet *Dve russkie narodnosti*, is explained also in G. Lami, *La questione ucraina fra ’800 e ’900*, Milano 2005, pp. 71-72.

21 The values of honesty, love, meekness and tolerance already professed in the *Main rules of the Society*, was considered by Kostomarov in antithesis against the Machiavellian ‘end that justifies the means,’ *sic et simpliciter* ascribed to the Jesuits ac. See N. Kostomarov, *Storie di Ucraina...*, p. 62. Paradoxically, at the beginning of the 1860s, characterized by the argument between the nationalist Mikhail Katkov (in the opinion of Aleksei Miller ‘the main opppressor of the Ukrainophils,’ A.I. Miller, *’Ukrainskii vopros’ v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraiia polovina XIX v.),* S.-Peterburg 2000, p. 28) and the Katkov of the St. Petersburg period and the “Osnova,” will be just Katkov to define the Ukrainophil’s acts as ‘perfidious Jesuit intrigue.’
the languages of the dominant countries (or at least those that had been linked to a state in the past) and the minority languages—as it was said in the case of the Little-Russians, the languages of the ‘simple folk’ (*prostonarod’e*).\(^{22}\)

The project of the Brotherhood, mainly authored by Kostomarov, envisioned the use of only one Slavic language for all religious rituals, regardless of the confession practiced. As a result, if one were to follow a somewhat forced interpretation, it could be argued that this official language might have been Church Slavonic, which was after all the only Slavic language already utilized on a liturgical level. Therefore there are some indications that Kostomarov wished to secretly favor the Orthodox Church over Roman or Greek Catholicism.

Reading between the lines allows one to discover other interesting aspects of Kostomarov’s thinking. What is written in verse no. 55, for example—viz., that “the Slavic offspring is the youngest brother of Japheth’s family”—makes an original and noteworthy statement.\(^{23}\) At least two fundamental consequences derive logically from this concise assertion: first of all, by stressing the European roots of the Slavs, Kostomarov distances himself from Petr Chaadaev’s “shot in the dark night” (although Kostomarov is actually inspired by it, as the whole of Russian thinking is); Chaadaev had claimed that the Russians—part of the Eastern branch of the Slavs—do not belong to either Europe or Asia (this, however, was meant culturally rather than ethnically). Secondly, Kostomarov reversed Chaadaev’s belief (thus agreeing with both Alekseĭ Khomiakov

---

\(^{22}\) Also Aleksandr Pushkin expressed an opinion with a meaning not at all derogatory, but enthusiastically admired, even if perhaps a little bit paternalistic: that in the line when called Little-Russian ‘the extraction that dances and sings.’ Therefore, a simple *narod*, lacking in the elite, even if, maybe, characterized by a bright folklore and by more strict tie towards the Slavic tradition perceived like more genuine.

\(^{23}\) *I Libri della Genesi*, p. 129.
and Johann Gottfried Herder on this point)\textsuperscript{24} that the Slavs’ ‘youth,’ together with their morality, would give them a role of leadership for all of mankind. The *Knyhy bytiia ukrains’koho narodu* are actually characterized by an eschatological conception of history, according to which Slavdom’s advent as the guide of human destiny would be the ultimate result.

In this perspective Ukraine—whose historical mission the *Bratchyky* were about to legitimize—would play a crucial role, being the place chosen by God to return freedom to Slavdom.\textsuperscript{25} Ukraine could play this role because it was the *trait-d’union* of all Slavic peoples, even those in ancestral disagreement: “And Ukraine will get up from the grave and will call again all Slavic brothers [...] And Ukraine will be an independent Republic within the Slavic Union [...] All peoples will then say, pointing to the spot on the map where Ukraine will be drawn: ‘The stone that was rejected by the builders has now become the key-stone’.”\textsuperscript{26}

It was easy to predict that Kostomarov’s historiosophy would meet with strong opposition from the authorities, although initially even members of the government were unaware of the significance of the Kostomarov’s thought. For example, the Deputy Minister of Public Education Sergeĭ Uvarov seemed to accept a moderate version of Pan-Slavism. However, later the most influential politicians of the *Carstvo* were aware of the risks associated with this idea. The circumstances surrounding the trial of the *Bratchyky* are well known to historians of the Tsarist Empire. Well-known is also the intense debate on the values and the goals of the Brotherhood which set the members of the establishment against each other.\textsuperscript{27} Apart from all this, it is now necessary to ex-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} *I Libri della genesi*, p. 141.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Cf. A. Franco, *Slavofilismo e ucrainofilismo secondo il centro dell’Impero multinazionale russo. Il carteggio fra il Presidente della Terza Sezione*
plain the reasons why the state rejected the agenda of the Bratchyky.

To put it briefly, from the authorities’ point of view the project promoted by Kostomarov and his followers had four fundamental weaknesses:

1) Fear about the possibility that the Pan-Slavic message spread by the Brotherhood could truly awaken the national claims of the other Slavic communities, which for the most part were in a state of quiescence, except for Poland, characterized by a mature nationalism. At that time the majority of Slavic nations were subjects of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, and of Prussia, but in any case not in a ruling position. That could have broken the equilibrium of the Holy Alliance, of which tsarist Russia had been one of the pillars since the time of its foundation;

2) Fear about the possibility that the still immature Ukrainophile movement, at that point formed only by the tiny Bratchyky group, could be attracted by the much better organized Polish nationalism. In such a case, these two movements could have joined to become a potential model for all the other non-Russian elites that were present within the immense imperial territory;

3) Fear about the possibility that Kostomarov’s teaching, characterized by a pacifist attitude and by democratic and republican ideals (which in turn involved a firm rejection of...
any form of autocracy and aristocracy), could undermine the very foundations of the imperial state;

4) Fear about the possibility that the Ukrainophile ideals, though for the moment limited to a tiny circle of intellectuals and university students, could reach the peasant masses; until that time these masses had been unaware of and indifferent to the national questions, but potentially they could be attracted by the language of the Bratchyky. The idea of promoting literacy in the Ukrainian language, which was supported by all the members of the Brotherhood, but especially by Kulish, met with Minister Uvarov’s opposition. Despite that, during the trial, Uvarov was the most conciliatory towards the movement, so much that this was one of the main reasons why he was ousted from his post as Minister of Public Education.

We can finally look at the legacy of young Kostomarov’s thinking among the Ukrainophile intelligentsia during the second half of the 19th century, before far more virulent forms of nationalism started opposing one another, along with the gradual emergence of new political and social ideas.

In a nutshell, we may note that it was especially Dra-homanov who followed in Kostomarov’s footsteps; like his predecessor, he also combined Ukrainophilism with Slavophilism, along with the desire to reform society in a deeply democratic fashion. The next generation, living on the verge of the 20th century, decided to abandon the Pan-Slavic leanings, thus losing any potential support that the movement might have found among the minor Slavic nationalities.

---

29 It enables to understand better the meaning of the following limits imposed by the government against the potential developments of the Ukainophilism, and so the Valuevskii Cirkuliar (1863), and the Êmskiï Ukaz (1876). Cf. D. Saunders, The Kirillo-Methodian Society, p. 691.
30 Ibidem, pp. 690-691.
Weak and contradictory echoes of a *narodnyj* tendency, together with a Slavophile attitude, can still be found in Pavlo Chubyns’kyi’s lines entitled *Shche ne vmerla Ukraina*, written in 1863, which in 1991 became the lyrics of the national anthem of the Ukrainian Republic. In line with the message of the *Knyhy bytiia ukrains’koho narodu*, Chubyns’kyi in the first part envisions a struggle for freedom fought by all ‘Slavic brothers’ together. In the second part, he describes the unlucky subjugation experienced by hetman Bohdan Khmel’nytskyi at the hands of ‘the cruel Muscovite’ (following, however, a not completely coherent kind of logic).32

In light of these conclusions, one might argue that Kostomarov’s followers in the second half of the nineteenth century were still unable to settle the controversy that had faced Slavic intellectuals Pushkin to Shevchenko, between the 1830s and the 1840s. In *Klevetnikam Rossii* (To the Slanderers of Russia, 1831), Pushkin expressed the opinion that the ‘Slavic brooks’ should converge towards the ‘Russian sea’—thus showing a Pan-Russian (rather than Pan-Slavic) and imperialist outlook. On the contrary, according to the lines that the Ukrainian author dedicated to the ‘illustrious Šafárik’ in the poem *Êretik* (The Heretic, 1845), the father of modern Pan-Slavism would metaphorically convince the same Slavic streams to move towards a unique sea—a sea, however, viewed in an completely egalitarian perspective.33

---


33 Cf. J. Isaevych, *Pan-Slavism in Ukraine*, pp. 24-25. In a more general way, Isaevych had stated beforehand that Pan-Slavism (at the same level as other concepts like the ‘gathering of the earth of Rus’*) has always been characterized by his wide semantic area. Therefore, it was always able to justify in the same way the expansionist plans of the tsarist Empire as well as the Soviet ones, both led by an ideal of Pan-Slavic solidarity (p. 23).