By the 1880s, the growth of anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria as well as the avalanche of pogroms in Russia and East Europe convinced a considerable section of the Jewish intelligentsia that assimilation was no longer a desirable nor a possible solution to the "Jewish Question." They came to realize that Jews were not only a religious group, but also a separate nation, bound by a common faith and sentiment rather than by land. According to these Jewish nationalists, the Jewish Question could only be solved if the Jews stood on a par with other nations, which could be attained by the collective return of Jews to the ranks of the nations as a people living in their homeland. This was why Dr. Theodor Herzl, as the founder of political Zionism, insisted that the Jews should be "granted sovereignty over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation."1

Herzl was not only an ideologue, but also an efficient organizer. In order to negotiate with the Great Powers in the pursuit of Zionist objectives, Herzl needed a strong base for which he could rely for the support of his policies. Therefore, he was determined to build the Zionist movement as an actor in international relations with the necessary apparatus of institutions and program. For this purpose, Herzl envisaged a congress of representatives of the Jewish people to be the chief organ of the Zionist movement. The institutional framework of the congress, he thought, should be in the nature of a national assembly, composed of representatives from each local Zionist community. Based upon these rules, the First Zionist Congress was convened at Basle, Switzerland, on 27 August 1897. In the Congress, which was attended by more than two hundred delegates from all over the world, the Zionists, first formulated a program defining their aims, and second laid the foundations of a permanent organization. With respect to the pronouncement of their ultimate aims, the Zionists were cautious not to insist on founding a "state." The Congress agreed to establish a "home in Palestine." The government of the Zionist movement was entrusted to the Actions' Committee which, under the presidency of Herzl, was responsible for the execution of all policies undertaken in the name of the Zionist Organization. In the Second Congress which was held in Basle in August 1898 it was decided to establish a bank under the name of the Jewish Colonial Trust to serve as the financial instrument of the organization.2
Palestine, which became the focus of the Zionists, was neither empty nor free of an existing sovereignty. It was part of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, inhabited by the Arab subjects of the Sultan. Therefore, Herzl admitted that the “decision is in the sole hands of His Majesty the Sultan.” Knowing the debt-stricken state of the Turkish economy, his strategy to convince the Sultan was to make him a financial offer he would not dare to refuse. Herzl came to Istanbul in the middle of June 1896, and through Philip de Newlinski he requested the Sultan to issue a charter, enabling the Jews to colonize Palestine in return for twenty million pounds. Newlinski lobbied at the Palace and is reported to have said to Abdulhamid II, “Without the help of the Zionists, the Turkish economy would not stand a chance of recovery.” Again with Newlinski’s ability to open doors in the Ottoman capital, Herzl managed to see the Grand Vizier, Halil Rifat Paşa, but the latter did not like the project at all. In any event, the authoritative Turkish response came on the second day of his stay. The Sultan was adamant. He told Newlinski, “if Mr. Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood. We will again cover it with our blood before we allow it to be wrested away from us.”

Herzl was not discouraged. Thanks to Professor Arminius Vambery, the Sultan’s confidant who acted as a double agent between Britain and Turkey, Herzl was granted an interview with Abdulhamid II on 19 May 1901. He discovered that Abdulhamid II had the most ardent desire to get the Ottoman Public Debt Administration which was under the supervision of the European Powers into his own hands. Herzl, therefore, devised a plan to liberate the Sultan from the grip of European financiers, a project that he described, like the legend of Androcles, as removing the thorn from the foot of the lion. Consolidation of the Ottoman Debt involved buying up the debt on the stock exchange by a Jewish syndicate within a period of three years. The acquisition of Turkish securities, Herzl stressed, would be on condition of the announcement of an Imperial Charter for the Colonization of Palestine by the Jewish people. On the basis of the Charter, the Jewish Colonial Trust would found a Land Company, incorporated under Turkish law, and would be charged with settling and organizing the Jews in Palestine.

It was true that the Sultan was highly attracted to the consolidation scheme. When he acceded to the throne, Abdulhamid II was compelled, owing to the exhausted state of Ottoman financial sources, to accept European control over Turkey’s debts by the decree of Muharrem. The Sultan’s fiscal policy in the years to follow aimed at the gradual paying up of the debt in order to release the Turkish economy from European bondage. Such control, he thought, jeopardized Turkish sovereignty and obstructed the economic development of the country. Abdulhamid’s greatest nightmare was to share the fate of Egypt which was de facto, if not de jure, occupied by the British after having failed to honor her debts. Therefore, the Sultan considered the Zionists’ project as a “wonderful idea” in saving Turkish economy from European tutelage.

Despite the favorable attitude of the Sultan, Herzl left the Ottoman capital empty-handed. The very reason he could not reach an agreement with the Turks
was his determination to regard the Consolidation and Colonization schemes together; he expected the Sultan to concede in the latter for his efforts in the former. The Ottomans, however, viewed Consolidation separately from the granting of a charter for the Zionists to colonize Palestine. Abdulhamid II received Herzl in the anticipation that he could serve as a go-between with the Ottomans and the Jewish financial houses. But when Herzl underlined his demand for a charter the Sultan was irritated and dropped any idea of reaching an understanding with the Zionists in financial matters. In his later negotiations, in February and July 1902, Herzl tried to convince the Ottomans of the Zionists’ loyalty. But all in vain. According to the Turks, “the purchase of Palestine, thus becomes a political question and not one of swelling our exchequer.”16 Unable to realize the real motives behind Ottoman intransigence, Herzl believed that the Sultan had used him in order to obtain better conditions from the French, who in the end undertook the consolidation of the Turkish debt.17

II

The Ottomans, indeed, had their own deep-seated political considerations for refusing the Zionist proposals. At a time when the multinational Ottoman Empire was feeling the pressure of separatist movements in the Balkans and East Anatolia, the Turkish Government feared the possibility of nurturing another nationality problem within its domains. Although the Zionist Program (1897) spoke of a Jewish “home” in Palestine secured by “public law,” the Ottoman authorities were not naïve enough to accept these declarations prima facie. They took Herzl’s Der Judenstaat as a guide to the sincerity of the Zionist aspirations. With respect to the clause “public law,” Ottomans had no illusions. Anthopoulos Paşa wrote from London on 8 June 1898 that “with the increase in the number of flourishing colonies in Palestine, the Zionist colonizers would not be contented to live under Ottoman municipal law.” He added that the Zionists, contrary to what they had said at Basle, would press for international recognition under the law of nations.18

The Ottoman ambassador in Berlin, Ahmet Tewfik Paşa, not only interviewed Herzl several times but also sent agents to the Congresses to obtain accurate information respecting the aims of the Zionists. In a detailed report to the Porte, Ahmet Tewfik Paşa wrote on 17 August 1900 that “we must have no illusions about Zionism. Although the speakers at the Congress dwelled upon vague generalities such as the future of the Jewish people, the Zionists, in effect, aim at the formation of a great Jewish State in Palestine, which would also spread towards the neighbouring countries.” According to the Ottoman ambassador, since Palestine could not possibly accommodate all the persecuted Jews throughout the world, totaling ten million people, the Zionists would use this “home” as a base for their future expansionist activities.19 Ahmet Tewfik Paşa’s worries fell on sympathetic ears in Istanbul. When Herzl and his colleagues started negotiating with Neville Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, over the issue of Jewish colonization in the Sinai, Abdulhamid II must have felt that Tewfik Paşa’s fears were justified.

Thus, Abdulhamid II admitted in his memoirs that the Zionists were not only interested in agricultural pursuits, as Herzl had argued, but were aiming to
establish a government of their own in Palestine. As early as 1895, the Sultan claimed that he understood their “evil projects,” and he added that the Zionists were too naïve to think that he would accept their proposals. He stressed that as much as he protected his Jewish subjects and respected the competent Jewish officials in the service of the Porte, he was still the enemy of those Jews who entertained certain ideas over Palestine. Abdulhamid II thought that the immigration and settlement of Jews in Palestine was harmful to the interests of the Ottoman Empire insofar as they would lead to the emergence of a “Jewish Question,” and especially dangerous at a time when the Turkish Government had Armenian troubles on its hands.

The Ottomans not only feared to face up to another nationality problem within the Empire, but also did not want to increase the influence of the Great Powers over the affairs of the Empire. One of the most important avenues through which the Powers tried to place Turkey under their tutelage was by the extensive use of the Capitulations. Turks never had a great disposition toward commercial activities, which they considered to be degrading to their chivalric culture. The rationale, therefore, behind the issuing of extraterritorial privileges was to attract foreign merchants and companies to Turkey. This was how the early Ottoman sultans thought they could cultivate the rich economic resources of the Empire. These Capitulations were issued from a position of strength, and, as far as the Sultan was concerned, possessed no binding obligations. He had the power to cancel them altogether. With the advent of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, having lost its initial vitality, was placed within the pale of the European political system whose more powerful members in 1856 at the Congress of Paris undertook to preserve its territorial integrity. As a result, the Capitulations acquired the features of law, becoming inter alia an instrument of exploiting Turkey’s economic resources on the one hand and of swelling the Turkish market with European industrial products on the other.

The most objectionable abuse of the Capitulations, from the Turkish point of view, was how it led to the emergence of the protégé (himâye) system. The protégé system was an institution by which Ottoman subjects could acquire foreign nationality or foreign protection without being required to reside in the country granting the protection, and thereby be entitled to the capitulatory privileges enjoyed by the nationals of the donor country in Turkey. Initially, this system was extended to a handful of members of the religious communities in the Holy Land. With the nineteenth century, however, the protégé system became very attractive to the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire. First of all, at a time when the Ottomans levied higher taxes to make up for the depleted sources of the Empire, the protégé system proved to be a convenient device in escaping such a burden, for the protégés of foreign Powers, according to the Capitulations, were immune from the Ottoman fiscal system. Second, the protégé system brought to the non-Muslim subjects of the Sultan an important political advantage. Under the protective wing of the great Powers, the nationalist movements within the Empire could afford to become more militant in the pursuit of their separatist ambitions. The Turks thought that the extension of the protégé system was a step in the direction of the secession of the territories inhabited by the protected nationals.
The Great Powers also reaped substantial benefits from the alliance with non-Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire. First, the influence of the West in the Orient had increased. The greater the number of her protégés, the greater would be the concerned country’s exploitation of the Capitulations. Second, the non-Muslim protégés in Turkey had also provided the Great Powers with the pretext to intervene in Ottoman internal affairs. By upholding the so-called rights of the Ottoman minorities, the Great Powers more often than not tried to shape Ottoman policies to fit their imperial interests. In Palestine, too, the Great Powers were exploiting religious differences in order to establish their respective spheres of interest in the region. It was France, as the champion of Catholicism, that placed the Maronites, Jacobites, and Uniates under her protective wing while Britain did the same for the Druzes and Protestants, Germany for the Templars, and finally Russia for the Orthodox, Copts, and Abyssinians.

Haunted by the fear of opening another door for European influence, Abdulhamid II stressed to Herzl that all Jewish immigrants must become Ottoman subjects and placed under the millet system. Yet, despite the guarantee given by the Zionist leader, his followers who managed to infiltrate into Palestine, sought and acquired foreign protection. Britain was the first Power to take the Jewish settlers under its protective wing. British protection was viewed with suspicion by the other Powers, most of whom thought that the British found in the Jews another means of increasing their influence in Palestine at the expense of other governments. Thus, each Power, imitating the British, did not hesitate to issue certificates of protection to the Jewish settlers, hoping that, by doing so it could counterbalance the influence of the rest.

From the Turkish point of view, these developments were particularly disconcerting. The Ottomans firmly believed that the Zionists were “another advance guard of further political European influence in the Ottoman Empire.” In a report Ali Ferruh Bey, the Ottoman Minister in Washington, wrote that the “time has come for His Imperial Majesty to take certain measures to repair the fault which his ancestors had committed by allowing the non-Muslim communities to settle in Palestine. As the journey of the German Emperor to Jerusalem clearly showed, Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, and Jews prepare the ground for the Powers to enhance their respective spheres of political and religious ambitions within the Ottoman lands.” Istanbul took the advice and decided to buttress the loyal elements in Palestine with Muslim immigrants. The Sultan declared, “We cannot view Jewish immigration favorably. We could only open our borders to those who belong to the same religion as we do.” Indeed, when Muslim Circassian refugees, in the face of growing repression in the Balkans and Russia, fled to Turkey, Abdulhamid II settled them in Hauran.

Because of the factors cited, the Ottomans took the Zionist movement seriously from its inception, and devised their policies to deal with it accordingly. It was Abdulhamid II himself who laid the cornerstone of the Ottoman reaction toward the Zionists. He was determined that the Turkish Government should to the best of its efforts prevent Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine.
The Sultan, in turn, asked the Cabinet to discuss the entire situation carefully at their meetings and work out detailed policies to cope with the Zionist phenomenon both at home and abroad. The final program, as formulated by the Council of Ministers and approved by the Sultan, entailed four sets of policies, for whose execution different Ministries were charged responsible. While the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was asked to persuade the Powers not to lend any support to the Zionist movement, the Ministry of the Interior had to find ways of preventing them from entering the country. For those Jews who, despite the efforts of the concerned Ministries, managed to get in, it was up to the Porte to make sure that they did not acquire foreign nationality and become entitled to Capitulatory rights. Further, it was up to the Department of Land Registration to prevent them from acquiring land in Palestine and environs.

Since Germany was the European Power most sympathetic to Turkey, the Ottoman Government thought that it should win first the support of the Kaiser for its anti-Zionist policies. Yet, that was going to be difficult. Wilhelm II had already declared himself ready to intervene with the Sultan on behalf of the Zionists. Tewfik Paşa, on instructions from the Palace, told Wilhelm II on his tour of Jerusalem in 1889 that “the Sultan would have nothing to do with Zionism and an independent Jewish Kingdom.”37 The Ottomans tried to convince him that since Zionism was a serious threat to Turkish sovereignty, Germany’s support of Herzl’s plans was incompatible with the German policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire: “The Germans should renounce the idea of introducing the Jewish people into the international community as a state, because this project, by creating a state at the center of the Ottoman Empire, would assure the ruin of Turkey.” Turkish propaganda in this connection was effective. The Allegemeine Zeitung wrote on 11 August 1900: “Live and let live; this should be the policy of the Great Powers, not only toward the Jews, but also toward the Turks.”38 As a result, Wilhelm II, anxious not to arouse the suspicion of the Sultan whose goodwill he needed for the successful implementation of his Drang nach Osten policies, lost his entire enthusiasm for Zionism.

It appears that Germany played a pivotal role in the shaping of other Powers’ attitudes toward Zionism. In her withdrawal of support from Herzl, Russia followed Germany’s example. Plehve, the Russian Minister of the Interior, had written to Herzl in August 1903 that “so long as Zionism consisted of wanting to create an independent state in Palestine . . . the Russian Government could be completely favorable to it.”39 It seems that the Russians gave their support to the Zionists to take the wind out of German sails. Suspicious as they were of the Wilhelmstrasse’s ambitions in the Near East, St. Petersburg must have thought that if the establishment of a Jewish state was unavoidable, it would be better to have it under Russian rather than German protection. But, once the Germans backed down fostering the Zionist cause in Palestine, the Russian Government must have realized that there was no need to complicate international relations with another nationality question. Thus, it placed the Jewish Question in cold storage.

As for the French, Paris was wholeheartedly against Herzl’s project. Considering that Paris had always regarded Syria (and Palestine) as her sphere of interest, the French Government watched suspiciously over events in Palestine. As
Bodenheimer, who accompanied Herzl in his Middle Eastern tour in 1889, wrote, “Any incautious declaration of a protectorate of a Jewish State would have led to dangerous complications. Should the French Fleet, alerted at Toulon, have anchored off the Syrian Coast, trouble would certainly have ensued.” Having recognized the potential danger to world peace, Britain contended to offer Herzl and his followers politically less sensitive spots, like Uganda and Cyprus, to fulfill their irredentist aspirations.

At home, the Ottomans met the Jewish immigrants with a series of “Entry Restrictions.” As early as 1882, the Ottoman local authorities, in pursuit of orders from the Ministry of the Interior, prohibited all foreign Jews, with the notable exception of pilgrims, to visit Palestine. Jews, however, could always enter Palestine as pilgrims, and then outstay their welcome. The mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Rauf Paşa, recognized that this did not accord with the Ministry’s real purpose, so he turned to Istanbul for advice. It was decided in 1884 that henceforth, Jewish pilgrims could only enter Palestine if their passports were properly visaed by Ottoman consuls abroad. On arrival, they were to hand over a deposit, guaranteeing their departure, and they were to leave after thirty days.

When a bad harvest and anti-Semitic outbreaks in Romania during 1899 led to a new influx of Jews to Palestine, the Ottomans met the challenge by issuing on 21 November 1900 a circular with respect to the “Conditions of Entry into the Holy Land by Hebrew Visitors.” According to these regulations, the Jews were no longer required to pay a cash deposit as a guarantee that they would depart after one month. Instead, all Jews, including Ottoman subjects, were to surrender their papers on entry and, in exchange, were to receive a residence permit allowing them to stay in Palestine for three months. This permit, because of its color, became known as the Red Ticket. It was to be handed back by the pilgrims on departure so that a check could be kept on Jews visiting Palestine. Detailed registers were to be compiled every month to enable the authorities to expel pilgrims whose permits had expired. Officials who failed to enforce these orders would be severely punished. The Jews who did not act in conformity with the existing orders were refused admission, and they were conducted back to the steamers that brought them to Palestine. It must be stressed, however, that during these procedures the Jews “suffered no ill-treatment whatsoever by anyone.”

The Ottoman authorities tried their best to deny foreign protection to Jews who managed by some illegal means to enter the country. The Bureau of Nationality at the Porte, set up in 1867, was charged to examine the claims of foreign nationality. If the evidence proved to be unsatisfactory, the Bureau had the right to refuse registration. Believing that the protégé system constituted a “source of inexhaustible abuses,” Said Paşa, the Grand Vizier, with a note dated April 1887, ordered the local authorities in Palestine that unless the Jews could produce documentary evidence to prove their right to foreign protection they must be treated as Ottoman subjects. In fact, the willingness on behalf of the Turkish authorities to implement these measures was remarkable. The British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir William White, was surprised that the “Porte is pursuing the practice of asserting its own sovereign rights even at the risk of disobliging the old claims of friendly Powers.”
After the issue of protection, the Ottoman government turned its attention to another aspect of Jewish settlement in Palestine, the question of land sales to the Zionists. The Ottomans tried to prevent the Zionists from acquiring real estate in Palestine. The law declared that "subjects of foreign governments are allowed to take advantage of the rights to possess property within or without towns in every part of the Imperial dominions with the exception of the Hejaz lands, in the same way as Ottoman subjects." Having realized this, the Turkish government on 5 March 1883 passed a law especially designed to stop Jewish settlers from obtaining any land in Palestine. Ottoman Jews, however, were not restricted in their purchase of land. It was they who, on behalf of the Zionist colonizers, concluded transactions with Arab landlords and registered the property with the local authorities under their names. Thus, in November 1892 the mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Ibrahim Hakki Paşa, was ordered by the Department of Land Registration to stop the sale of land to all Jews, including the Ottoman subjects.

IV

Although the Zionists failed to accomplish their political objective of acquiring a Charter for a proposed Jewish state, they managed, despite Ottoman intransigence, to penetrate and settle thousands of their followers in Palestine. By 1908, the Jewish population of Palestine had risen to 80,000, three times its number in 1882, when the first entry restrictions were imposed. By 1908, the Jews had acquired some 156 square miles of land and set up twenty-six colonies. The failure of the Ottomans to prevent the establishment of a Zionist foothold in Palestine must not be placed squarely on the shoulders of the local authorities. During the period under consideration, Palestine was governed by exceptionally honest and competent administrators who earnestly administered the Porte's regulations. The wide gap between the theory and practice of the Ottoman policies was attributable to the intervention of the Powers on behalf of the Zionist colonizers.

Of all the Great Powers, Germany and Russia had genuine interests in the promotion of Zionist policies. As Herzl told Wilhelm II and W. K. Plehve, the exodus of the Jews from these countries, from the domestic point of view, meant that the Socialist movement would be deprived of its leaders and supporters on the one hand, and anti-Semitism would be sapped of its impetus on the other. With respect to external considerations, both the Germans and Russians must have thought that these Jewish elements, once placed under their protection, would prove themselves useful agents for the enhancement of their respective spheres of interest at that part of the Ottoman Empire.

Wilhelm II admitted that the Jews could play an invaluable role in Germany's Drang nach Osten. He was convinced that the "settlement of the Holy Land by the wealthy and industrious people of Israel will bring unexampled prosperity and blessing to the Holy Land, which will do much to revive and develop Asia Minor. Such a settlement would bring millions into the purse of the Turks... and so gradually help to save the 'Sick Man' from bankruptcy,... The Turk will recover... and it would not be so easy to dismember Turkey." Germany had a vested interest in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, for she knew that in
the case of disintegration and scramble of Turkey she had to share the spoils with the other Powers. At present, however, the Kaiser's Germany commanded an unrivaled position in Istanbul, thanks to the concessions—among which the Berlin-Baghdad railway project was the most formidable—granted by the Sultan. Moreover, the German drive to the East had one inherent weakness: the flow of capital was not backed by a stream of immigrants. So deep rooted was the Ottomans' opposition to foreign colonization that General von der Goltz, the German military adviser to Turkey, had to advise his countrymen "not to migrate to the Near East if friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire were to be maintained." These factors clearly explain why Jewish colonization was viewed favorably by the Germans.

Russia was also guided by similar considerations, extending her political influence in the Middle East. As aptly described by the British consul in Jerusalem:

Pan-Slavism in Macedonia supplements the religious influence of the Holy Mountain, and in the same way Orthodoxy in Palestine is seconded by a racial policy, and of a rather remarkable type. There are, indeed, few Slavs, but there are plenty of Russian subjects, and these are the Ashkenazim Jews, the erstwhile inhabitants of Poland and the Ukraine, who, driven thence by a relentless persecution, find themselves to their astonishment personae gratae to the Russian Consul-General in Jerusalem. Despite the regulation of the Turkish Government against Jewish immigration, the influx continues, and the Russians do not omit, by extending their comprehensive protection to the Israelites, to add to their political bow a second string of no mean strength.

It appears that one of the more important factors to influence the attitudes of all Powers was their preoccupation with the preservation of their privileges under the Capitulations. Jewish settlers, in order to enjoy the privileges conferred upon foreigners under the umbrella of Capitulations, sought and obtained foreign protection. More importantly, these certificates, unlike Ottoman passports, failed to mention the religion of the possessor. By making it very difficult for the local authorities to distinguish a Gentile European from a Jewish protegé, the Zionists could easily evade the Turkish restrictions. The Powers, in the meantime, had to safeguard Jewish interests as if they were their own nationals. When the representatives of the Powers in Palestine found out that the settlers had been obtaining certificates by fraudulent means with the sole objection of escaping the Turkish regulations, they started to consider the gradual withdrawal of their protection upon the Jews. The Powers, however, had put themselves in a terrible dilemma. If they admitted that the Zionists forfeited certificates of protection and declined to watch over Zionist rights, it would have been tacit admission on their part that the Turkish viewpoint on Capitulations (as well as on the protégé system) was correct: an institution ridden with abuses, obsolete, and ripe for abolition. Because they did not desire to forego the reservoir of power and influence they had established over the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the Powers had no choice but, willingly or reluctantly, to become the promoters of Jewish colonization in Palestine.

As a result of the intercession of the Powers on behalf of the Zionists, Ottoman policies restricting Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine were evaded. With respect to the entry restrictions, the ambassadors in Istanbul made
it clear to the Porte that the right of their subjects to travel within the Ottoman dominions was secured by the Capitulations, and, therefore, anti-Zionist regulations were considered to be ipso facto null and void as far as they regard persons enjoying their protection. The representatives of the powers not only prevented the expulsion of the Jews who did not possess proper documents, but also provided them with a loophole to secure their entry into Palestine. After intimidating the Turks, the Powers gained from the Ottoman Government the concession that entry restrictions would only be applied to Jews coming to Palestine "en masse," but Jews who arrived in single families would not be molested. As the foreign Jews could now enter Palestine with no difficulty, the Porte in June 1900 tried to stop them from disembarking at Ottoman ports, requesting the Powers to instruct their shipping companies not to take aboard Jews intending to settle in Palestine. But, the Powers rejected this appeal, and the Porte's problems remained.

With respect to the question of land sales to Jews, it must be remembered that in November 1892 the mutasarrif of Jerusalem, Ibrahim Hakki Paşa, was ordered to stop the sale of miri (public) land to Jews. As most of the land in Palestine was miri, there were loud protests from foreigners—Jewish and Gentile—who had invested in land. The embassies in Istanbul took up their cause, protesting a manifest breach of the Capitulations. As with the entry of individual Jewish settlers, the Powers were able in 1893 to extract a concession from the Porte regarding land purchase. Foreign Jews, legally resident in Palestine, would be permitted to buy land on condition that they could prove their legal status in the country and undertook not to let "illegal Jews" live on their land (if urban) or set up a colony on it (if rural). In conclusion, it could be said that if the Zionists lost on the diplomatic front and failed to obtain a Charter for a Jewish home in Palestine, they won in another way. Thanks largely to the intervention of the Powers, the Zionists evaded the Turkish regulations of immigration and settlement, and were by and large successful in establishing in Palestine a stronghold in the form of colonies which was destined to become the nucleus of the future Jewish state, Israel. In 1911, seeing that all his government's efforts had been in vain, Abdulhamid II, by then deposed and exiled, admitted to his private physician that the achievements of the Zionists in Palestine were just an introduction, preparing the groundwork for accomplishing their ultimate goal: "I am sure that with time they can and will be successful in establishing their own state in Palestine."

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NOTES

2On the growth and development of Zionism, there are numerous studies in English, the most up to date and definitive being David Vital's *The Origins of Zionism* (Oxford University Press, 1965).
The Ottoman Empire, Zionism and the Question of Palestine


4Newlinski was a Polish noble and a renegade who earned his living in European capitals spying for the Sultan. See N. M. Gelber, “Philip Michael de Newlinski,” Herzl Year Book, ed. R. Patai (New York, 1959) II, 113-152.

5Ottoman Foreign Ministry Archives (OFM), Tercüme Mütevevvia-Siyan (TM-S) dossier 129/1, document no. 19, 28 July 1897.

6Diaries, I, 378.


8Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO), Vambéry Papers 1895-1911, 800/32.

9Diaries, III, 960-963, 977, 997, 1001-1009, 1016-1017, 1079, 1092-1093, 1173; Central Zionist Archives (CZA), H VIII 870.

10OFM, TM-S, 129/1, no. 17. See also A. Galanté, “Abdulhamid II et le Sionisme,” Hamenora (March, 1933), 2-11.


15Atif Hüseyin Bey, Haturalar, Turkish Historical Association Library Y-225, handbook no. 8, p. 17.

16OFM, 332/17, no. 9796/34, Ali Ferruh Bey to Tewfik Paşa, Washington, 5 May 1899.

17Diaries, IV, 1319. Basing their arguments upon Herzl’s assumption, both N. Mandel (The Arabs and Zionism before World War I, [Berkeley, Calif., 1976], p. 13) and I. Friedman (Germany, Turkey and Zionism [Oxford University Press, 1977], pp. 100-101) fail to see that the French, suspicious as they were with the Zionists’ projects for Syria and Palestine which they considered threatening their traditional spheres of interest in the Near East, applied pressure on the Sultan not to leave the Consolidation project to Herzl. See OFM, TM-S, 129/2, no. 32, 13 July 1902.

18OFM, 332/17, no. 23598/216, Anthopoulos Paşa to Tewfik Paşa, London, 8 June 1898.

19Ibid., no. 1683/136, Ahmet Tewfik Paşa to Tewfik Paşa, Berlin, 17 August 1900. Friedman (Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, p. 73) fails to see that Ahmet Tewfik and Tewfik were not the same person, the former being the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin and the latter being the Foreign Minister.


21Abdülhamid, Siyasi Hatıratım, pp. 76-77.


24On Abdulhamid’s views on European protection and the Himaye system, see Yıldız Palace Archives (YPA), 9/2626/72/4 and 9/2006/72/4.


26Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF), 2d ser., II, 440, Delcassé to Boppe, Paris, 14 October 1902.


28FO, Confidential Print, Correspondence Concerning the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey, no. 8202/2, Dickson to O’Conor, Jerusalem, 8 December 1902. Also: C. R. Conder, Tentwork in Palestine (London, 1978); L. Oliphant, The Land of the Gilead (London, 1880); J. L. Wallach, ed., Germany and the Middle East 1835–1939 (Tel Aviv, 1975).
340 Mim Kemal Öke


33 VAP, CII/48–49/54/136.

34 Abdüllahim, Sıvası Hattatım, p. 73.


37 Friedman, Germany, Turkey, and Zionism, pp. 65–68.

38 VAP, CII/275/276/54/136, Ahmet Tewfik to Tewfik Pasa, Berlin, 17 August 1900.

39 Ibid., no. 3309/179, Ahmet Tewfik to Tewfik Pasa, Berlin, 31 November 1903.


41 PRO, FO, 195/1410, no. 86, Elridge to Dufferin, Beirut, 24 October 1882.

42 PRO, FO, 78/3506, no. 48, with enclosures, Wyndam to Granville, 22 January 1883.

43 OFM, TM-S, 129/2, no. 124/55, the Ottoman Consul in Odessa to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 11 February 1902; VAP, CII/275/276/54/136, Ahmet Tewfik to the Palace, Washington, 24 January 1899; Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) (1888), no. 1068, Straus to Bayard, Istanbul, 23 February 1888; PRO, FO 195/1581, no. 21, the Foreign Office to Moore, London, 24 September 1887.

44 PRO, FO, 195/1581, no. 9, Moore to White, Jerusalem, 5 March 1887; OFM, TM-S, 129/1, the Russian Embassy in Istanbul to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 7 December 1898.

45 PRO, FO, 78/5479, no. 71, Dickson to Bunsen, Jerusalem, 29 December 1900, and no. 34, O’Connor to Lansdowne, Istanbul, 27 January 1901; FRUS (1901), no. 316, Grimscrom to Hay, Istanbul, 31 January 1901; OFM, TM-S, 129/2, no. 18/942, the German Embassy in Istanbul to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 27 April 1906.

46 PRO, FO, 195/2028, no. 54, Dickson to O’Connor, Jerusalem, 12 October 1898.

47 FRUS (1886), no. 445, Cox to Bayard, Istanbul, 5 January 1886.

48 PRO, FO, 83/1723, no. 394, White to Salisbury, Therapia, 10 September 1891.

49 FRUS (1884), no. 414, Arif Paşa to Wallace, Istanbul, 22 January 1884; OFM, TM-S, 129/1, no. 311/9, the Ottoman Foreign Ministry to the American Embassy in Istanbul, 19 July 1898.

50 PRO, FO, 78/3997, no. 21, White to Salisbury, Istanbul, 4 April 1887.

51 For an English translation of the Ottoman Land Code, see: FRUS (1898), no. 78, enclosure 1, Angell to Sherman, Istanbul, 5 January 1898.

52 FRUS (1906), no. 1370, Jay to the Secretary of State, Istanbul, 25 April 1906.

53 PRO, FO, 195/1765, no. 35, Dickson to Clare-Ford, Jerusalem, 30 December 1892.

54 N. Bentwich, Palestine of the Jews (London, 1919); M. Burnstein, Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine Since 1900 (Tel Aviv, 1934); A. Ruppin, Three Decades of Palestine (London, 1936); Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem, 1973), s.v. “Immigration and Settlement.”

55 A list of the colonies could be found in N. Sokolow, History of Zionism (London, 1918), II, 238–239.

56 Mandel (The Arabs and Zionism, p. 19) and Friedman (Germany, Turkey and Zionism, p. 120) claimed that the Turkish authorities in Palestine were easily bribed, and subsequently turned a blank eye to the activities of the Zionists. If the Turkish officials received any favors at all, these were isolated cases, and thus, it would rather be an unconvincing argument to generalize and attribute the establishment of a Jewish stronghold in Palestine to such a trivial factor.
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57 FO, Correspondence, 5900, no. 36, Moore to White, Jerusalem, 24 May 1889, and no. 27, Elbridge to White, Beirut, 11 March 1889; Accounts and Papers, Cl (1897), Dickson to Currie, Jerusalem, 25 November 1896; CZA, z 2/598, Levontin to Wolffsohn, Jaffa, 25 June 1907.

58 Diaries, II, 726–734, 737.

59 Friedman, Germany. Turkey and Zionism, p. 66.


61 FO, Correspondence, 7307, no. 91, Bigham to the Foreign Office, Jerusalem, 24 December 1898.

62 PRO, FO, 195/2028, no. 67, Dickson to O’Conor, Jerusalem, 21 November 1898; FO, 78/1692, Finn to Earl Russell, Jerusalem, 19 June 1862.

63 PRO, FO, 78/3630, no. 6, Earl Granville to Lord Dufferin, London, 28 January 1884; FO, 195/1480, Elbridge to Dufferin, Beirut, 18 March 1884; ibid., no. 13, 28 May 1884 and no. 17, 20 June 1884 (with enclosures).

64 DDF, 2d ser., 1, D/146, Delcassé to Constans, Paris, 19 March 1901, p. 18; OFM, TM-S, 129/2, no. 56/86, the French Embassy in Istanbul to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 24 September 1898; ibid., no. 17/19, the Italian Embassy in Istanbul to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 20 April 1899 and no. 27/33, 8 July 1901; ibid., no. 67/108, the German Embassy in Istanbul to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 16 January 1901; ibid., no. 125/55, the American Embassy to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 2 September 1898; ibid., no. 17/21, the Austrian Embassy to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 17 April 1900; ibid., no. 54, the Russian Embassy to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 7 December 1898; PRO, FO, 195/1575, White to Moore, Therapia, 19 October 1887; FO, 195/1607, White to Moore, Istanbul, 3 May 1888; FRUS (1888), no. 1083, Straus to Bayard, Istanbul, 19 May 1888.

65 PRO, FO, 195/1607, White to Moore, Istanbul, 6 October 1888; FRUS (1888), no. 1098, King to Bayard, Istanbul, 22 October 1888; OFM, TM-S, 129/2, no. 1497, the German Embassy to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 28 September 1898.

66 PRO, FO, 78/5479, no. 218, O’Conor to Salisbury, Istanbul, 27 June 1900 and no. 239, Salisbury to White, London, 9 November 1891; OFM, TM-S, 129/2, no. 1497, the German Embassy to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 28 September 1898; ibid., no. 52/1624, same to same, 18 July 1900; ibid., no. 52/545, the Russian Embassy to the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, 16 August 1900.

67 PRO, FO, 195/1765, no. 35, Dickson to Clare-Ford, Jerusalem, 30 December 1892; FO, 195/1789, no. 278, Nicolson to Dickson, Therapia, 23 July 1893 (with enclosures).

68 Atif Hüseyin, Hatıralar, p. 18.