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Callimachus, Poetry, Love and Irony

by Giuseppe Giangrande

In a paper entitled 'Callimachus, Poetry and Love' (*Eranos* 1969, p. 33 ff.) I endeavoured to clarify in detail certain basic conceptions which Callimachus entertained concerning his poetry and his amatory activities, and in particular I restored to Callimachus' epigram 28 Pf. the point *καλλος* which the critics realized the poem must contain in line 6, but were not able to fit into the line. A. Barigazzi has just written a note, entitled 'Amore e Poetica in Callimaco' (*Riv. Filol. Class.* 1973, p. 186 ff.), which represents a step backwards in the history of the question. Since Barigazzi has thrown an uncommon amount of conceptual confusion into the problem elucidated by me, and since the matter is of great importance for the correct understanding of Callimachus' art, I deem it necessary to dispel the clouds produced by Barigazzi so that Callimachus' art may shine in its full splendour.

Barigazzi's note consists, as far as I can judge, in either superfluous or erroneous statements. First of all, let us get rid of the superfluous. Barigazzi (*art. cit.* p. 193 f.) quotes Callimachus' epigram 6 Pf.

Τοῦ Σαμίου πόνος εἰμὶ δόμῳ ποτὲ θεῖον ἀοιδόν
δεξαμένου, κλείω δ' Εὐρυτον ὅσσ' ἔπαθεν,
καὶ ξανθὴν Ἰόλειαν, Ὀμήρειον δὲ καλεῦμαι
γράμμα· Κρεωφύλῳ, Ζεῦ φίλε, τοῦτο μέγα

and, stating that "in questo epigramma la critica ha rilevato *soltanto* (italics mine) che esso documenta l'attribuzione a Creofilo del poema ciclico *La presa di Ecalia*", goes on to affirm that the point of the epigram consists in the "difesa dell'originalità in

poesia propugnata da Callimaco ”, because “ la chiusa Κρεωφύλω, Ζεῦ φίλε, τοῦτο μέγα è ironica: bel successo per Creofilo! Egli ha ottenuto di cancellare se stesso e di far considerare il suo poema come di Omero. Ciò che per gli altri costituisce una lode, per Callimaco, gelosissimo dell’originalità, è un grande biasimo ”; in sum, “ nella chiusa ” of the epigram “ c’è una forte ironia, in contrasto con la serietà delle affermazioni precedenti ”. What Barigazzi states is far from new: that the final distich of this epigram introduces “ plötzlich ”, and in contrast with the preceding lines, “ klare Ironie ”, and that the work of Creophylus, in so far as it “ als Homerisch gelte ” (= “ far considerare il suo poema come di Omero ”) is regarded by Callimachus as “ nichts wert ”, was already explained almost forty years ago by Gaba-thuler (*Hellen. Epigramme*, Diss. Basel 1937, p. 61), as I recently pointed out (*Class. Rev.* 1969, p. 160).

Let us now proceed to Callimachus’ epigram 28 Pf. Here is the text:

Ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθω
 χαίρω, τίς πολλοὺς ὥδε καὶ ὥδε φέρει·
 μισῶ καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐτ’ ἀπὸ κρήνης
 πίνω· σιγχάνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.
 Λυσάνη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός — ἄλλα πρὶν εἰπεῖν
 τοῦτο σαφῶς, Ἥχῳ φησι τίς; ἄλλος ἔχει;

3 μισέω, οὐδ’ perperam Mein. 4 σιγχάνω recte P 6 τι; ἄλλος restitui, τις ἄλλος P

Barigazzi underlines that the epigram under discussion serves not only to stress the poet’s “ ripugnanza ” against the “ amore vulgivago ”, but “ anche ad illustrare il canone della nuova estetica callimachea ”, i. e. “ il criterio della *novità ed originalità, per analogia* (italics mine) con la ripugnanza dell’amore vulgivago ” (*art. cit.* p. 193). All this has long been well known, as I underlined in *Eranos* 1969, p. 33, with note 3 (“ Callimachus, as it were, applies the same principle of exclusiveness to his literary activities as well as to his amatory ones: for this *parallelism* [= “ per analogia ”] cf. Bum, *loc. cit.*”); cf. also Gow-Page, *Hell.*

Epigr. on line 1041 : “ Callimachus ... expresses his preference for ... *originality* in poetry [= “ originalità ”] ”.

For a detailed discussion of the problems which the epigram presented I refer the reader to *Eranos* 1969, p. 33 ff., *Eranos* 1972, p. 87 ff. and *Maia* 1974, p. 228 ff. : it will suffice here to summarize the essential factors. Everybody agrees that the point of the epigram cannot but consist in a piece of “ typically Callimachean and epigrammatic ‘ Selbstironie ’ ”¹ : Callimachus has emphatically stated that he does *not* love (μισῶ) a περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, but that he *loves* (σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός) Lysanies². The sense of μισῶ ... περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον ... Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός is, in sum : “ I do not love an unfaithful ἐρώμενος, but you, o Lysanies, I love very much ”. The emphatic σὺ, introduced by the adversative particle δέ³, “ opposes Lysanies to the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, Lysanies who, precisely because being the opposite of a περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, is loved by Callimachus ”⁴. In other words : Callimachus believes Lysanies to be *not* a περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, i. e. to be an ἐρώμενος faithful to, belonging exclusively to Callimachus, otherwise the poet would hate (μισῶ), instead of loving, Lysanies. Callimachus expects from echo an “ assicurazione di fedeltà ” to the effect that Lysanies belongs only to Callimachus and to nobody else (to use Gallavotti’s apt words : cf. *Maia* 1974, p. 229), but the poet’s expectation is flatly contradicted by echo : echo reveals to the startled and discomfited poet that Lysanies belongs not only to Callimachus, but *also* to another (ἄλλος). Unless echo refuted Callimachus’ belief, “ l’epigramma non avrebbe punta, cioè non avrebbe senso ” (cf. *Maia* 1974, p. 228). In other words : the epigram can have a point, i. e. make sense, only if the poet learns

¹ *Eranos* 1969, p. 35; on “ Selbstironie ” in Hellenistic epigrammatic poetry cf. ‘ Quelques aspects de la technique littéraire des épigrammatistes alexandrins ’, *Graz. Beitr.* in the press.

² The type of wording καλός + the name of the ἐρώμενος or ἐρωμένη is, in Greek, a declaration of love made by the lover to the ἐρώμενος or to the ἐρωμένη, as was underlined by Göttling (*Eranos* 1969, p. 35, n. 10 and p. 42); cf. Callim. fr. 73 Pf., and Rohde, *Griech. Rom.*³ p. 173; cf. also Thes. s. v. καλός, 899 C, and especially Robinson-Fluck, *A Study of Greek Love-Names*, Baltimore 1937.

³ Cf. in particular *Eranos* 1969, p. 39, with note 16.

⁴ *Eranos* 1969, p. 39 f.

from echo, to his startled discomfiture, that Lysanies, instead of belonging exclusively to Callimachus, as the latter believed, belongs *also* to another (cf. Gow-Page, *ad loc.*: “*also* another”; Hauvette “un autre *aussi*”; Headlam $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$: *Eranos* 1969, p. 33 and 38). The word required both by the point and by sense, in line 6, is $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ (which alone can mean “*also* another”, in Greek: $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ can only mean “another”); moreover, $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ is required not only by point and sense, but also by the laws governing echo: $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ corresponds, in echo’s reverberation, to $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, whereas $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ cannot correspond to $\kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, in that this latter word begins with κ -, not with α -. For these reasons, scholars tried to fit $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ into line 6, but they could not succeed, until I emended line 6 in a way which not only is palaeographically, syntactically, phonetically and contextually suitable, but, for good measure, is confirmed by the *usus auctoris*. Barigazzi (*art. cit.* p. 189) states that “non convince ... il Giangrande”. On what grounds does he substantiate his statement? First of all, he declares that the phonetic equivalence $\alpha\iota = \epsilon$, $\epsilon\iota = \iota$ “non è sicura” (*art. cit.* p. 190, n. 2). Such a declaration is ungrounded: papyrus evidence shows that $\alpha\iota$ was pronounced ϵ , and $\epsilon\iota$ was pronounced ι in Egypt in Callimachus’ time (cf. *Eranos* 1972, p. 88, quoting Mayser-Schmoll). Barigazzi (*art. cit.* p. 190, n. 2), incredible though it may sound, follows Cataudella (who was regrettably nescient of the evidence afforded by papyri) instead of following the standard authority on papyri, i. e. Mayser-Schmoll.

Secondly, Barigazzi contends that the “doppia ... interrogativa [i. e. Ἡχώ φησι τί; $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ ἔχει;] del Giangrande ... ritarda la chiusa, togliendole vivacità e scioltezza”. Now, the double-question pattern of the type used by Callimachus (Ἡχώ φησι τί; $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ ἔχει;), whereby the second question relates what has just been heard by the speaker, is, in Greek literature, precisely used to express sudden and deep astonishment, consternation, discomfiture on the part of the speaker at what he has just heard (material in *Eranos* 1969, p. 38 ff.; *Eranos* 1972, p. 88 f.); Callimachus’ words mean “Echo says *what?! that another* has him, too?!” (*Eranos* 1972, p. 89, n. 2). Therefore, the “doppia interrogativa” in question is, if anything, uniquely suited to express the astonishment and consternation felt by Callimachus at his having just heard echo’s unexpected revelation. Unless Barigazzi can demonstrate that the

double-question pattern is not exclusively used, in Greek literature, to express sudden and deep consternation and astonishment felt by the speaker at a revelation which he has just heard, his contention is devoid of any foundation. The words employed by Callimachus are a masterpiece of climactic effect: the poet first asks 'Ἠχώ φησι τί; "echo says *what?*!" (by which first question the climax is built up: note the *emphatic* τί at the end of the sentence), and then the revelation, the point, the "chiusa" follows at the very end of the epigram, cleverly placed after the skilful building up of the climax (καὶ ἄλλος ἔχει; "that another has him, too?!"). This masterpiece of climactic effect is typical of Callimachus' epigrammatic style, as I have shown in detail in *Eranos* 1969, p. 38 f.: how on earth Barigazzi can state that "the doppia interrogativa del Giangrande ritarda la chiusa, togliendole vivacità e scioltezza", flying in the face of Callimachean and Greek usage, and without so much as trying to specifically refute even one of the linguistic and stylistical facts indicated by me, is past my comprehension and, I trust, past the comprehension of my readers.

Thirdly: the point of the epigram, as all scholars have always maintained, consists in "Selbstironie": Callimachus, after unguardedly and boldly stating that he loves Lysanies because the latter is not περίφοιτος and belongs exclusively to Callimachus, pretends, in jocular "Selbstironie", to hear echo refute his own statement. Barigazzi asserts (*art. cit.* p. 191) that the "carattere ironico" of the "doppia interrogativa" uttered by Callimachus "sa troppo di artificio". Now, if there is one feature which is *typical* of Callimachus, and indeed of Hellenistic epigrammatic poetry, this is "Selbstironie"⁵, which "Selbstironie" is, of course, contained in the *point*, in the conclusion of epigrams, in the final couplet (exactly as is the case with Callimachus *ep.* 28 Pf.: the final couplet 5-6 contains the "Selbstironie"): in other words, what Barigazzi — without substantiating his statement — calls "artificio" happens to be, of all things, an ingredient *typical* of Callimachus' art!

⁵ Cf. above, note 1; Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht.* II, p. 112; Köhnken, *Hermes* 1973, p. 429, with note 15.

Finally, Barigazzi has not understood the logical sense of the epigram. Callimachus first emphasizes that he does not love an ἐρώμενος who is περίφοιτος, and then adds “*but* you, o Lysanies, I love very much” (Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός). *Ergo*: in the poet’s belief, Lysanies is not περίφοιτος, Lysanies belongs *exclusively* to Callimachus, otherwise Callimachus, instead of loving the boy, would μισεῖν him. Barigazzi (*art. cit.* p. 189) writes: “non convince il Giangrande, che vuol interpretare σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός come una dichiarazione d’amore [N. B.: not only I, but all scholars explain these words in the epigram as a “dichiarazione d’amore”] ... e l’amore sarebbe alimentato dalla coscienza della fedeltà dell’amasio: una cosa è dire ‘io ti amo’ ed un’altra dire ‘io ti credo fedele o esclusivamente mio’. Infatti uno può essere innamorato di una persona che pur sa appartenere ad altri”. Barigazzi has forgotten the very text he is talking about: the point is that Callimachus is definitely *not* “uno” prepared to share Lysanies’ love with “altri”! Callimachus has precisely underlined, in lines 1-4, that he can *only* love an ἐρώμενος who is not περίφοιτος, i. e. an ἐρώμενος who belongs “esclusivamente” to Callimachus. In other words: Callimachus’ “amore” towards Lysanies must necessarily be, on the very basis of Callimachus’ own words which Barigazzi has strangely lost sight of, “alimentato” by Callimachus’ “coscienza della fedeltà dell’amasio”, because, if the “amasio” Lysanies were not faithful to Callimachus, and were περίφοιτος, Callimachus could not feel any “amore” towards him. Barigazzi further contends, without substantiating his statement, that the phrase Λυσανίη ... ναίχι καλός, although the type ὁ δεῖνα καλός has elsewhere in Greek, and indeed in none other than Callimachus himself (*ep.* 29,3 Pf.) the sense of a “dichiarazione d’amore” (*art. cit.* p. 189, n. 1), must be here, contrary to Greek and Callimachus’ usage, a mere praise of Lysanies’ “bellezza” (*art. cit.* p. 189): but this contention can be demonstrated to be doubly erroneous. First of all, the evidence available shows that the type ὁ δεῖνα καλός is, in Greek, a declaration of love by the ἐρῶν to the ἐρώμενος (cf. above, footnote 2; the monograph by Robinson-Fluck is particularly instructive on this); secondly, Barigazzi, as a consequence of his not having understood that Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός means “but you, o Lysanies, I love very much”, cannot understand the adversative particle δέ (*art.*

cit. p. 189), which is of course perfectly clear once we remember that Λυσανίη, σὺ ναίχι καλός means “I love you” (the sense is: “I do not love a περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, *but* you, σὺ δέ, I love very much, because you are not περίφοιτος and belong exclusively to me”). All scholars know that ὁ δεῖνα καλός in Greek is a declaration of love, and have therefore realized that Λυσανίη ... ναίχι καλός, καλός is a declaration of love by Callimachus to Lysanias; Barigazzi, accusing all scholars of a “fraintendimento generale” concerning the “avversativa col pronome” σὺ δέ, declares that we must understand not εἶ (as “tutti credono”), but ἐμὸς εἶ. Barigazzi, that is, promulgates that “si deve (*sic*) sottintendere qualcosa come ἐμὸς εἶ”, in order to create the sense “ma tu, o Lisania veramente bello bello, sei mio”. Needless to say, Barigazzi’s proposal is untenable on four counts. First of all, it is grammatically impossible: in the type ὁ δεῖνα καλός, the adjective καλός is always predicate, i. e. governed by the *verbum substantivum* εἶναι to be understood⁶. We need not look any further than Callimachus himself to find that the type ὁ δεῖνα καλός (with καλός regularly used as a predicate governed by the *verbum substantivum* εἶναι to be understood) is used e. g. at epigr. 29,3 Pf. καλός ὁ παῖς (where καλός ὁ παῖς is a “dichiarazione d’amore”, as Barigazzi himself admits, *art. cit.* p. 189, n. 1). Secondly, Barigazzi’s proposal is conceptually impossible. Not only is the construction proposed by Barigazzi flatly contradicted by Greek usage (καλός, in Callimachus’ line, cannot be an attribute, as Barigazzi contends): if Callimachus had wanted to say Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός, ἐμὸς εἶ, the poet would have perpetrated a grotesque tautology. The words Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός, in so far as having the meaning which is normal in Greek “I love you”, precisely imply

⁶ The ellipsis of the *verbum substantivum* is the most common type of ellipsis in Greek epigrams, (for Callimachus, cf. Lapp, *De Callim. trop.* p. 75; for Meleager, cf. Ouvre, *Mél.* p. 203; for other epigrammatists cf. Knauer, *Die Epigr. des Asklep.* pp. 37, 53, and Waltz, *De Antipatro*, p. 84 f.). In Callimachus’ phrase Λυσανίη, σὺ ... ναίχι καλός we must understand εἶ, exactly as e. g. in *A. P.* XII 9,1 καλός, Διόδωρε, σὺ (cf. Robinson-Fluck, *op. cit.* p. 55). In the type ὁ δεῖνα καλός, the *verbum substantivum* can be used or omitted, but καλός is always predicate: cf. e. g. Robinson-Fluck, *op. cit.* p. V, n. 1, p. 13 ὁ παῖς ναίχι καλός, καλός (= Callimachus’ Λυσανίη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός, discussed on p. 60).

that “il poeta crede che Lisania sia soltanto suo” (Barigazzi, *art. cit.* p. 189), because, as we have already observed, Callimachus could only love an ἐρώμενος who was “soltanto suo”, and could not love a περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος.

Thirdly: Barigazzi’s proposal is contextually impossible. He thinks that Callimachus wanted to say Λυσάνη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός, ἐμὸς εἶ “ma tu, o Lisania, veramente bello bello, sei mio” (*art. cit.* p. 189 f.) and that echo interrupts Callimachus in mid-speech, preventing him from saying ἐμὸς εἶ: but τοῦτο, in the sentence πρὶν εἰπεῖν τοῦτο σαφῶς⁷ can only denote, according to Greek usage, words *already actually* uttered by Callimachus, and cannot possibly denote the poet’s “pensiero” not uttered by the latter, as Barigazzi unaccountably contends (*art. cit.* p. 189 f.).

Fourthly: Callimachus has emphatically expressed the notion that he hates, does not love, the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος: the “avversativa δέ” (to use Barigazzi’s words, *art. cit.* p. 189) can, in so far as it is adversative, only express the *opposite* of the notion of Callimachus *hating* the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, i. e. can only express the notion of Callimachus *loving* Lysanies; the sense, in sum, is: “I do not love the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, *whereas, but*, I love you, o Lysanies”. The sense suggested by Barigazzi (more or less: “io *non* amo un περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος, *ma tu*, o Lisania veramente bello bello, *sei mio*”) is semantically absurd: the fact that Lysanies belongs to Callimachus (“sei mio”) is not a notion which can be opposed to the notion of the poet not loving the περίφοιτος ἐρώμενος: the only notion that the “avversativa” δέ can oppose to Callimachus not loving is Callimachus loving Lysanies, which latter notion is, in Greek, regularly expressed by the type ὁ δεῖνα καλός and is accordingly expressed, in the epigram, by Λυσάνη, σὺ ... ναίχι καλός.

The catalogue of Barigazzi’s errors is not exhausted. He admits at first that “la pointe finale dell’epigramma” must consist in echo contradicting Callimachus’ unwise and smug belief in Lysanies’ “fedeltà ed esclusività”: “il poeta crede che Lisania sia soltanto suo”, but “l’eco” reveals to Callimachus that the

⁷ For a detailed discussion of this sentence I refer the reader to *Maia* 1974, p. 229.

boy “è anche di altri” (*art. cit.* p. 189; italics mine). So far, so good: but then Barigazzi violates Greek grammar, by contending that the notion “anche di altri” is expressed, in the epigram, by ἄλλος alone (*art. cit.* p. 189): this is of course grammatically impossible, because “anche ... altri”, in Greek, cannot but be expressed by καὶ ἄλλος: that ἄλλος alone can be equivalent to καὶ ἄλλος is only a figment of Barigazzi’s imagination, unsupported by any evidence. Having violated Greek grammar, Barigazzi goes on to violate Greek phonetics, by affirming that the phonetic equivalent αἰ = ε, εἰ = ι in Egypt, in Callimachus’ time, “non è sicura” (*art. cit.* p. 190, n. 2): we have already seen that this affirmation of his is ungrounded. Then Barigazzi proceeds to violate the literary *topos* concerning echo. I have shown (*Eranos* 1972, p. 88; *Maia* 1974, p. 229) that echo, according to a precise and conventionally established Greek literary *topos*, reverberates a given phrase entirely⁸

⁸ The reverberation by echo of the words uttered by Callimachus is totally accurate, in complete accord with the *topos* in question. Barigazzi states (*art. cit.* p. 191) that “tra καλός e ... καὶ ἄλλος” there cannot occur a confusion “di suono, per la diversa lunghezza della prima sillaba e per il diverso accento tonico”. His statement is wrong. As regards the “diversa lunghezza”, scholars have long observed that there is no problem, because the “lunghezza” καλός and καὶ ἄλλος was topically regarded as fully interchangeable (cf. Schneider, *Callimachea* I, p. 153; Gow-Page, *Hell. Epigr.* II, p. 377): Callimachus plays, in his epigram, on the phonetic and semantic equivalence καλός = καὶ ἄλλος; the difference between intervocalic -λ- and -λλ-, which was not perceived already in Attic times (cf. Meisterhans, *Gramm.*³ p. 93 ff.), was not felt in Hellenistic Egypt (cf. Mayser, *Gramm. Pap.* I¹, pp. 211 ff., 218 ff., cf. also Crönert, *Mem. Gr. Herc.* p. 75 ff.); it may be added that according to Apollon. *Anecd. Bekk.* p. 565,13 [quoted in *Thes.* s. v. καλός, 903 C-D], the Dorians pronounced καλλός, and that Callimachus’ habits of pronunciation may well have been Doric). As regards the alleged “diverso accento tonico”, there is no problem either. Of Callimachus’ phrase ναίχι καλός, καλός, the poet hears the first two words ναίχι καλός reverberated by echo (his astonishment is caused by these two reverberated words, before the third reverberated word, καλός, reaches his ear: cf. *Maia* 1974, p. 229). The grave mark, in papyri, “merely indicated lack of accent” (Sturtevant, *Pronunc. of Gr. and Lat.* Groningen 1968, § 107 a): whenever finals of oxytones, in papyri, are marked grave, this means that they are unaccented, i. e. low-pitched. It is not clear under which conditions polysyllabic oxytones within the phrase remained oxytones (as maintained by Laum, *Alexandr. Akzentuationssyst.* Paderborn 1928) or lost their oxytone nature (as maintained by Sturtevant, *op. cit.* § 106 d, following Wackernagel, Debrunner and Hermann: cf. Vendryès, *Traité d’accent.* § 37-43): we do know, however, three impor-

accurately⁹, omitting only letters at the beginning of the phrase¹⁰:
 “ aussitôt que Callimaque ... a énoncé les mots ναίχι καλός, καλός,

tant points which throw light on Callimachus' epigram under discussion. First: a succession of two dissyllabic oxytones sounded unacceptable to the Greek ear (Laum, *op. cit.* p. 12, quoting Philodemus). Second: dissyllables must by necessity consist of one unaccented (low-pitched) and one accented (high-pitched) syllable (cf. Dionys. *De comp. verbor.* XI,10 ff., Roberts and Sturtevant, *op. cit.* p. 98). Thirdly: papyrus evidence shows that, when the succession of two dissyllabic oxytones occurred in a phrase, the first of them lost its accent on the final syllable and, since one syllable in the dissyllable must be accented, became paroxytone: cf. PSI 1214 = Norsa, *Scritt. Lett.* p. 20, where the grave marks in the phrase ἄλως χονδρὸν denote that the second syllable of ἄλως is unaccented (whence it follows that the first syllable is the accented one) and that the first syllable of χονδρὸν is unaccented (whence it follows that the second is the accented one). In sum: the succession ἄλως + χονδρὸν (or χονδρὸν) was, in the phrase, pronounced ἄλως χονδρὸν (or χονδρὸν): the oxytone ἄλως became, in the phrase, a paroxytone. Accordingly, Callimachus pronounced ναίχι κάλως καλός: papyrus evidence is beautifully confirmed by echo's reverberation ἐχει καλλός. The first of the two καλός uttered by Callimachus, in sum, was pronounced by the poet as a paroxytone (κάλως), which perfectly corresponds to echo's paroxytone καλλός. Conclusion: Barigazzi (*art. cit.* p. 191 f.) accuses echo of not producing a “rispondenza fonetica esatta” between what Callimachus utters and what echo reverberates. On the contrary: since the quantities of καλός and καλλός were phonetically interchangeable, since confusion in pronunciation between -λ- and -λλ- was common, and since the first of the two καλός was uttered by Callimachus as a paroxytone κάλως, the “rispondenza fonetica” between what Callimachus utters (κάλως) and what echo reverberates (καλλός) is absolutely perfect, in the light of the specific factors which I have brought to light. By way of appendix, I should like to add that Philodemus' passage quoted by Laum, *op. cit.* p. 12 fits in neatly with papyrus evidence: Philodemus, discussing *Il.* XVII 265, emphasizes that we cannot (τιθῶμεν) add another dissyllabic oxytone (ἐκτός) to dissyllabic ἄλως as used by Homer in his line under discussion, i. e. oxytone ἄλως; from PSI 1214 it appears that a dissyllabic oxytone (such as χονδρὸν) can follow the word ἄλως only if the latter is used *not* as an oxytone, but as a paroxytone (ἄλως χονδρὸν). The question is discussed in detail by Dr. J. Moore-Blunt, in *Problems of Accentuation in Greek Papyri* (forthcoming).

⁹ Barigazzi's statement, according to which ἡχώ τις “può riferirsi” to an alleged “imperfezione fonetica, ed essere inteso ‘una voce come l'eco’” (*art. cit.* p. 192) is doubly erroneous. First of all, phrases such as ἰσθμὸν τινα “qualcosa come un istmo” (adduced by Barigazzi) denote something which is *like*, but *not* the real thing (in this case, *not* a real isthmus): now, real echo does exist, but “una voce” other than real echo (which real echo always reverberates with accuracy the words uttered by humans) does not exist; secondly, if “una voce come l'eco” existed, it would, in order to be *like* real echo, have to reverberate phrases with the same accuracy as echo.

¹⁰ For a detailed discussion of how many *initial* letters of a phrase are omitted

l'écho lui répond αἶχι καλός, καλός (la première lettre, ν-, a été omise par l'écho¹¹ et Callimaque croit entendre ἔχει καλλος, καλλος ” (*Eranos* 1972, p. 90). Barigazzi promulgates that “il gioco dell'eco” must be [on *what* evidence concerning the topos of reverberation by echo?] “circoscritto alle due parole καλός e καλλος ” (*art. cit.* p. 192). To begin with, we have already seen that the point of the epigram, i.e. sense, demands καλλος, not καλλος; we can now add that the demands of point and sense are fully confirmed by the ancient topos concerning the way in which echo reverberated phrases: given the fact that echo, in the topos under discussion, omits only the *initial* letters of a phrase, echo must omit the initial letter ν- of the phrase ναίχι καλός, καλός (as Göttling has already underlined), but cannot certainly omit the letter κ- from the word καλός which is in the middle of the phrase uttered by Callimachus and reverberated by Echo.

But this is not Barigazzi's only violation of the precise Greek topos concerning echo: there is worse to come. What about ἔχει? Ἐχει is a word which, according to the phonetic evidence afforded by papyri (whereby αι = ε and ει = ι) and according to the topos concerning the way in which echo reverberates phrases uttered by humans (whereby the *initial* letter of the phrase ναίχι καλός, i.e. the letter ν-, is dropped by echo) is the exact reverberation, by echo, of Callimachus' ναίχι: Barigazzi promulgates that “il verbo ἔχει” was not reverberated by echo, but is “un'aggiunta interpretativa” by Callimachus. According to Barigazzi, Callimachus wrote (*art. cit.* p. 192):

Ἦχῶ φησί τις · “καλλος” — ἔχει

by echo on the basis of the acoustic factors cf. *Maia* 1974, p. 229. Since Callimachus says “due volte καλός”, and echo is reported by Callimachus to say καλλος once, not twice, Barigazzi erroneously infers that “non si deve ricercare una corrispondenza fonetica tra ναίχι e ἔχει” (*art. cit.* p. 191). Such an inference is unwarranted, as I have shown in *Maia* 1974, p. 229 n. 7: Echo's αἶχι καλός, misheard by Callimachus as ἔχει καλλος, is the reverberation of Callimachus' words ναίχι καλός (pronounced by him, as I indicated, ναίχι κάλος), a reverberation which reaches Callimachus' ear *before* the second reverberated καλός does.

¹¹ “Echo, quae in reciprocatione p r i m a s vocabulorum consonas solet omittere, respondet ἔχει” (Göttling, in *Eranos* 1969, p. 42).

According to Barigazzi, that is, Callimachus wanted to say *Λυσάντη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλός, καλός, ἐμὸς εἶ*, but echo interrupts the poet in mid-sentence, preventing him from saying *ἐμὸς εἶ*: echo reverberated only Callimachus' *καλός*, which it transformed into *ἄλλος*. Apart from the fact that the reverberation of *καλός* by echo demands *καῖλλος*, not *ἄλλος*, apart from the fact that the sense of the epigram demands *καῖλλος* (only *καῖλλος* can mean “*anche ... altri*”, to use Barigazzi's own words), apart from the fact that the words *ἔχει καῖλλος* are (conformably to the phonetic evidence afforded by papyri and to the *topos* whereby echo had to drop the initial letter ν- from the phrase *ναίχι καλός* uttered by Callimachus) exactly what echo is expected to reverberate, how on earth could *ἔχει* be uttered by a speaker other than echo? Callimachus himself underlines that it is only echo who is speaking to Callimachus (*ἡχώ φησι*): Barigazzi intrudes a new interlocutor, which he calls Callimachus' “*amara voce del subcosciente*”. That is: according to Barigazzi, echo interrupted (produced “*un'interruzione*”: *art. cit.* p. 189) Callimachus in mid-sentence, preventing him from saying *ἐμὸς εἶ*: echo reverberated only *ἄλλος* (in the sense “*anche altri*”, a sense which is grammatically impossible, as we have seen!): since *ἄλλος* “*reverberated alone, without a verb, is obviously meaningless*” (cf. *Eranos* 1969, p. 37, n. 11: *ἄλλος* can only mean “*another*”, and cannot mean “*also another*”), Callimachus was compelled to add the word *ἔχει*, which word is an “*aggiunta interpretativa*” on the part of Callimachus, a sort of “*amara voce del subcosciente*” which is necessary in so far as it “*completa e chiarisce il pensiero con l'aggiunta di ἔχει*” (*art. cit.* p. 191 f.). But echo, according to the precise and unambiguous literary *topos* already mentioned, never interrupts a speaker in mid-sentence, truncating his speech, least of all truncating it in such a way that the truncated speech as reverberated by echo needs an “*aggiunta interpretativa*” in order to become comprehensible. Echo, in sum, having heard Callimachus say *ναίχι καλός, καλός*, reverberates, according to the precise rules of the *topos*, *αἶχι καλός* (which reverberated sound Callimachus mistakes for *ἔχει καῖλλος*), but could not possibly interrupt Callimachus in mid-sentence and reverberate only *ἄλλος* (or even *καῖλλος*) alone. Whereas, according to the *topos*, echo omits, in its reverberation, the *initial* part of a sentence (in this case ν-), Barigazzi violates the *topos*, indeed

turns the *topos* topsy turvy, and would compel the unfortunate echo to interrupt Callimachus and to omit, in its reverberation, the *end* of what Callimachus wanted to say (i.e. to omit the words ἐμὸς εἶ which Barigazzi would force into Callimachus' mouth).

Barigazzi has misunderstood the text also as far as Callimachus' ideas concerning love and poetry are concerned. Callimachus has started by saying that he "applies the same principle of exclusiveness to his literary activities as well as to his amatory ones" (*Eranos*, 1969, p. 33): he wants to achieve, as Barigazzi himself says, "esclusività" (*art. cit.* p. 192) in love and in poetry. Now, echo contradicts Callimachus but — pointedly enough — *only* as far as love is concerned. Callimachus, that is, may well be successful in achieving "esclusività" in his literary activities, but cannot achieve it in his amatory exploits, because "l'esclusività in amore è ... impossibile": this is the clear lesson imparted by Echo to the poet, to use Barigazzi's own words (*art. cit.* p. 192). This is the important point: Callimachus is very serious indeed about his own originality as a poet, and does not admit any jokes about it. Callimachus is "gelosissimo" of his poetic "originalità", as none other than Barigazzi says (*art. cit.* p. 142), and therefore echo, very pointedly, does not contradict him as far as his originality as a poet is concerned. "It is highly significant that Callimachus' *Selbstironie*, in the epigram under discussion, is strictly limited to erotic matters, and is not extended to his poetic convictions: he felt too strongly about his poetic *credo* to allow himself any irony, even jocular, on the subject. Echo could certainly not accuse him of treading literary patterns also used by others" (*Eranos* 1969, p. 41). Barigazzi (*art. cit.* p. 192), flying in the face of Callimachus' own words (and indeed contradicting himself, i.e. forgetting that he admits that "Callimaco è gelosissimo dell'originalità" in poetic matters) asserts that "l'epigramma è serio", and that "il senso dell'epigramma" is that "l'esclusività in amore è difficilissima o impossibile; altrettanto difficile è fare opera esclusiva, originale in poesia". The epigram says nothing of the kind, as far as Callimachus' "poesia" is concerned: echo has only taught Callimachus that his striving after exclusiveness in love is impossible, witness Lysanies' περὶφοντος nature, but certainly not that it is "altrettanto" impossible for Callimachus to achieve "opera esclusiva, originale in poesia".

To sum up: I hope I have demonstrated in detail that Barigazzi's statement "non convince ... il Giangrande" is totally ungrounded, and that his proposal concerning the epigram under discussion is nothing but a continuous series of regrettable errors¹².

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¹² For the sake of completeness, I should like to take this opportunity of adding that A. Allen's note in *Class. Philol.* 1973, p. 211 ff. has no validity. He would like to read

Ἦχώ φησι· "τίς ἄλλος ἔχει;"

commenting: "before Callimachus can say clearly that he loves Lysanies, Echo asks if the boy has another lover". Allen's proposal is refuted by no less than three factors. First of all, the theme of the epigram is that Callimachus dislikes *sharing* any pleasures, literary, amatory or whatever (πάντα τὰ δημόσια) and can accordingly only love an ἐρώμενος exclusively belonging to him. The point of the poem (contained, as usual, in the final distich) consists in echo revealing to Callimachus the fact that Lysanies, whom Callimachus loves because he regards the boy as not περίφοιτος, not belonging *also* to another besides Callimachus, has effectively *also* another lover, *besides* Callimachus (κἄλλος): cf. *Eranos* 1969, pp. 33, 38. The meaning read into the final distich by Allen, to the effect that Callimachus loves Lysanies "yet cannot have him since another has him already", would make the final distich irrelevant to the previous context (which is about Callimachus loving the boy in so far as the latter is possessed exclusively, and not shared, by Callimachus, not about whether Callimachus *or* another possesses the boy), and would therefore destroy the very point of the epigram. In sum: echo, for the point to exist, must reveal to Callimachus the fact that Lysanies has *also* another lover, besides Callimachus (κἄλλος), and must not ask whether the boy has a lover *other* than (ἄλλος) Callimachus. Secondly, the laws of reverberation by echo require κἄλλος (as reverberation of καλός), not ἄλλος, as I have underlined in the present paper and in my previous ones. Thirdly, echo reverberates the words pronounced by a speaker, but never adds any word *de suo*: Callimachus said ναίχι καλός, without τίς, so that echo cannot possibly reverberate a τίς not pronounced by Callimachus. To sum up: I cannot understand how Allen's proposal got past the referees. As for the solution indicated by me, Allen's objections are groundless. Flying in the face of Greek syntax, Allen calls "strained syntax" the construction Ἦχώ φησι τίς; κἄλλος ἔχει; because he thinks that the *oratio obliqua* (κἄλλον ἔχειν;) should follow φησι τίς; but I have already indicated that the construction of the type φησι τίς; + *oratio recta* (κἄλλος ἔχει;) is the *normal* one, when the speaker wants to express astonishment. The fact that the examples

quoted by me come from drama are significant: Callimachus, in mock-seriousness, employs a dramatic construction in order to express his consternation at learning the revelation by echo. The whole point is that Callimachus, in "Selbstironie", affects astonishment: anything "less surprised" than *καλλος ἔχει*; ("less surprised" are Allen's own words!) would, of all things, destroy the point of the epigram. Allen himself recognizes that *ἡχώ φησι τί*; "displays great amazement": precisely! Callimachus' "great amazement" is the point of the epigram, as I have stressed (cf. *Eranos* 1969, p. 39: "mirationem"). Finally, Allen unaccountably states that the question should be "*ἔχει καλλος*; rather than *καλλος ἔχει*"; but, as I have already pointed out (*Eranos* 1972, p. 89), the reversed word-order (in this case *καλλος ἔχει*;) is regularly used when the speaker wants to "faire ressortir le mot capital" (in this case the word *καλλος*).

McKay's note in *Grazer Beiträge* 1974, p. 116 ff. is entirely erroneous. He cannot understand "why *καλλος* makes the couplet irrelevant": I have explained, in the present paper and in my previous ones, why the text requires *καλλος*. He is perplexed by "the role of *σαφῶς*" and by the fact that the poet says *καλός* "twice", whereas echo reverberates this word "once": I have explained all this in detail in 'Due Note Callimachee' (*Maia* 1974, p. 229, especially note 7). "The existence of *an καλλος*" as Lysanies' sole lover (as opposed to the existence of *καλλος*, i. e. also another lover, in addition to Callimachus), cannot possibly reveal to Callimachus "Lysanies' promiscuity", as McKay very strangely asserts. The epigram needs *καλλος*, as all the critics (Headlam, Gow-Page, Hauvette, etc.) have long recognized. "Promiscuity" presupposes the existence of at least two lovers, Callimachus and also another, in addition to Callimachus. What McKay calls "a hybrid function for echo" (*art. cit.* p. 118) is in reality the normal, indeed the only possible function of echo according to the ancient *topos* as explained by me in *Maia* 1974, p. 229, note 7: McKay's "judgment" (*art. cit.* p. 118) rests exclusively on his ignorance of the *topos* in question.